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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to § 78-2a-3(2)(h), Utah
Code Ann. 1953 as amended.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Was the lower court's finding of fact that the marital residence of the parties was

partially separate property, clearly erroneous?
2.

Did the lower court abuse its discretion in the matter in which it divided the

marital residence?
3.

Is Plaintiff entitled to attorneys fees on appeal?
STANDARD FOR REVIEW

1.

The standard for review to determine a clearly erroneous finding of fact is whether

it is against the clear weight of the evidence, or, the Court is "left with the definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been committed", despite evidence to support the finding.
Cummings v. Cummings, 821 P.2d, 472, 476 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
2.

A discretionary decision by a trial judge should be reversed if the ruling is so

unreasonable as to be arbitrary and capricious or a clear abuse of discretion. Weaver v. Weaver,
21 Utah 2d, 1966, 442 P.2d 928 (1968); Ames v. Maas, 846 P.2d 468, 476 (Utah Ct. App.
1993).
3.

As to attorneys fees on appeal, this court should determine whether the court
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awarded such fees to the party seeking the same and if she prevails on appeal, remand to the
lower court for a determination of the award of appropriate fees. Shaumberg v. Shaumberg. 875
P.2d 598, 604 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND ORDINANCES
The following constitutional provisions, statutes, and ordinances are determinative or of
central importance to this appeal:
1.

When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include in it equitable orders
relating to the children, property, debts or obligations, and parties. Utah Code
Ann. § 30-3-5(1) (Supp. 1996).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This is an appeal from a Supplemental Decree of Divorce entered August 12, 1996 after
trial, before the Honorable J. Philip Eves in the Fifth Judicial District Court, in and for Iron
County, State of Utah. (R. 166-172).
The parties were previously divorced on or about the 15th day of June, 1995. The
proceedings were bifurcated and all other issues ultimately went to trial on November 8th and
9th, 1995 before the Honorable J. Philip Eves, District Court Judge. (R. 172). After a
Memorandum Opinion of the court entered December 7, 1995 (R. 106-116), Defendant filed a
Motion to Correct Clerical Mistakes, Oversights, and Omissions, which was heard by Judge
Eves on January 16, 1996. (R. 117-121; 141). On March 22, 1996 the district court denied
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the Defendant's Motion to Correct Clerical Mistakes, Oversights, and Omissions. (R. 146-147).
After the ruling upon Defendant's motion and, based upon a Memorandum Opinion, the
Supplemental Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce were finally entered
by Judge Eves on August 12, 1996. (R. 151-172).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff and Defendant were married in Beaver, Utah, on August 16, 1972. (R. 6, 12).
Three (3) children were born as issue of the marriage, but at the time the Complaint for Divorce
was filed, only one (1) child was under the age of majority; namely, Colin Tony Robert
Christiansen, born July 29, 1980. (Tr. 23) (R. 6, 12-13). The parties acquired a home after the
marriage which they sold prior to 1982 and received net proceeds from the sale of said home in
the amount of $35,000.00. The parties then decided to build a second home, using the
$35,000.00 net proceeds from the sale of the first home to be applied toward the down payment.
Prior to 1982 and the construction of the second home, the Defendant's parents deeded to the
Defendant a parcel of property to both Plaintiff and Defendant's names as joint tenants. In 1982
the parties began construction on their second home. (Tr. 28). Plaintiff participated in the
actual design of the home and was active in supervising all phases of construction. (Tr. 31). The
Defendant's testimony varies about what sums of money were actually borrowed by Plaintiff and
Defendant toward the construction of the home, however; the Defendant testified that the parties
jointly originally borrowed at least $20,000.00 but probably as much as $60,000.00 toward the
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construction of the home (Tr. 408-411). The Defendant, although uncertain of the actual amount
of the loan, did testify that the parties made payments on the note from marital funds for a period
of three (3) to four (4) years after the note was taken out until the note, whether $20,000.00 or
$60,000.00, or anywhere in between, was paid off. (Tr. 412). Eventually the family partnership,
known as "Christiansen Trucking," borrowed money against the marital home in the amount of
approximately $97,000.00 and, as of the date of trial there was a balance on the partnership note
in the amount of approximately $90,000.00. At trial the home had a stipulated appraised
value of $185,000.00. (R. 158). At the time of the divorce the Defendant had a 25% interest in
the family partnership. Although Plaintiff had no named interest in the partnership the court
considered Defendant's interest in the partnership as marital property. (Tr. 549, 550) (R. 155).
Despite Plaintiffs contrary testimony at trial, the lower court found Defendant's parents
contributed an additional $165,000.00 cash as a gift to Defendant, toward the construction of the
marital residence. From 1982 for approximately a period of six (6) to seven (7) years thereafter,
Defendant was driving truck and was otherwise engaged in business affairs and was gone from
the marital residence for four (4) to five (5) days a week. Plaintiff was left with the sole
responsibility of raising the children, repairing and/or maintaining the home, landscaping the
yard, and otherwise preserving the marital home. (Tr. 31-32, 393-394).
The district court ultimately concluded that the Plaintiff be awarded one half of the
$35,000.00 from the previous home plus an additional $2,500.00 for a sprinkler system which
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was financed by her parents as a gift to the Plaintiff. The Court also concluded that all other
amounts paid toward the construction of the home was a gift by Defendant's parents and thus,
remained separate property of the Defendant. (R. 156-158).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Point I: Despite the trial court's finding that the land and construction monies used to
build the marital residence were a gift from Defendant's parents, because of the maintenance,
enhancement, and protection of the property by Plaintiff and substantial evidence of
commingling of the gifted funds with joint marital funds and a joint marital loan, the marital
property lost its identity as being Defendant's separate property and should have been divided as
marital property.
Point II: The trial court's finding as to division of the marital residence was an abuse of
discretion because it failed to consider other factors besides the parties relative economic
contributions to overcome the presumption that the equity in the marital property should be
divided equally.
Point III: Assuming Plaintiff prevails on this appeal, then she should be entitled to
attorneys fees on appeal because the court below found she was entitled to them.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE LOWER COURT'S FINDING OF FACT THAT THE
MARITAL RESIDENCE OF THE PARTIES WAS PARTIALLY
5

SEPARATE PROPERTY WAS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS

Because Plaintiff is contesting the findings of fact of the trial court, the Plaintiff must
first marshall all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's findings.
Cummings v. Cummings, 821 P.2d 472, 476 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
The lower court's crucial finding in this case was as follows: "The Court finds that the
funds and real estate provided by Defendant's parents were intended to be a gift to him only, in
the amount of $165,000.00, as an early distribution of his future inheritance". (R. 158, f 12).
Based upon this finding, the lower court concluded that the remaining equity of the home, was
the $35,000.00 down payment was separate property of Defendant. (R. 156, ^(18).
The following evidence (findings) supports the Courts findings:
1.

Defendant's mother and father both testified at the time of trial that the real

property and funds for the construction of the home was intended to be a gift to the Defendant
only as an early inheritance (R. 156-158, Tflf 12, 15);
2.

The Defendant testified at the time of trial that the real property and funds used to

construct the home were a part of his pre-inheritance and was thus separate property (R. 156,
If 16);
3.

There was no evidence that there was an intent by Defendant to give a gift to

Plaintiff when the deed to the home was made out in both of their names, as joint tenants (R.
156-157, Tft 15-16);
6

4.

The Plaintiff did not contribute "substantial" labor improving the value of the

home, or any other "extraordinary" act preserving the value of the home. (R. 157, Tf 14).
Based on the standard of review, as to the first two items of evidence the Plaintiff
must, of course, concede that the real property and construction funds were a gift to the
Defendant only. The trial court, however, has failed to properly analyze whether the gift lost its
identity as separate property consistent with Utah case law.
There are three factors the court should consider in determining whether separate
property loses its identity and becomes marital property. The existence of any one of those
factors alone would be satisfactory to find that the separate property lost its identity. Those
factors are as follows:
1.

Whether the other spouse has contributed to the enhancement,
maintenance or protection of that property and thereby acquired an
equitable interest in it;

2.

Whether the property has been consumed or its identity lost through
commingling or exchanges; and

3.

Whether the acquiring spouse made a gift of the property to the other
spouse.

Osguthorpe v. Osguthorpe, 804 P.2d 530, 535 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). See also Mortensen
v. Mortensen. 760 P.2d 304 (Utah 1988); Burke v. Burke, 733 P.2d 133 (Utah 1987); Teece
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v/Teece, 715 P.2d 106 (Utah 1986); Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
Factor #1: The evidence is uncontroverted that Plaintiff landscaped the property, used
gift monies to install a sprinkler system, maintained the property, wallpapered the home, planted
flowers, and did all of the house and yard work, while raising the parties' three minor children.
The Plaintiff did this for a period of six (6) to seven (7) years.1 The Plaintiff did this while the
Defendant, during the same time frame, was driving truck and was gone from the marital
residence four (4) to five (5) days per week leaving the Plaintiff with all household obligations.
Factor #2: There is also substantial uncontro verted evidence of commingling. The
parties sold their first home and invested the net proceeds consisting of $35,000.00 into the
construction of their new home. The real property upon which the home was built was held in
joint tenancy. The parties jointly borrowed money to construct the home and, at least a portion
of that debt was discharged using marital funds. The home was also used to secure a partnership
debt which the court found was at least 25% marital property. The Defendant also admitted that
in his Answers to Interrogatories, he stated that the house and real property were owned by he
and his wife jointly (Tr. 265).
This fact pattern is analogous to a married couple having a joint bank account. They
open the account with $35,000.00 of joint funds, together they borrow additional funds and

Obviously Plaintiff contributed more to the protection and maintenance of the home than "sweeping the floor and planting a few
flowers every year" as stated by Judge Eves during closing arguments. (Tr. 591).
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place them in the same account, and then the husband receives a cash gift from his parents
which he also deposits into the account. The parties keep the account open for a period of
thirteen (13) years and during that time they lend a portion of those funds to a partnership of
which the husband is a partner but the husband's interest in the partnership is determined to
be marital property. There should be no question that because of such commingling, all of the
remaining funds left in the account would be considered marital property.
Factor #3: The Defendant, by placing the marital residence in both he and Plaintiffs
name, expressed no other intention than that it was to be a gift, the Defendant effectively
admitted the same in Answers to Interrogatories and trial testimony as discussed above.
Consequently, as to the third item of evidence, the joint tenancy deed, by itself, was substantial
evidence of a gift from Defendant to Plaintiff. The Defendant presented no evidence that the
deed was not intended to be a gift from Defendant or his parents to Plaintiff; only that he
"thought" that the deed was joint "maybe" because of Plaintiff s investment in the home.
Plaintiff, therefore, need not have presented additional evidence that it was intended as a gift.
Mortensen, 760 P.2d at 307.
As to the fourth item of evidence supporting the lower court's findings, the court's
reasoning is not supported by existing case law and thus, is clearly erroneous. Nowhere in the
cases cited above is there any language requiring "substantial" or "extraordinary" contributions to
the maintenance and protection of the property. Indeed, the extent of the contribution is not

9

even a criteria. Mortensen, 760 P.2d at 308; Osguthorpe, 804 P.2d at 535.
POINT II
THE LOWER COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN THE
MANNER IN WHICH IT DIVIDED THE MARITAL
RESIDENCE.
There is no question that the trial court has substantial discretion in dividing marital
property. Sorensen v. Sorensen, 769 P.2d 820, 823 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). Therefore, even
assuming the entire equity in the home was marital property, the Defendant may argue that the
court was within its discretion to divide the marital home as the court did; however, the trial
court abused its discretion under the circumstances of this case because it did not divide the
property in accordance with the standards set by Utah appellate courts. Haumont v. Haumont,
793 P.2d 421, 424 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); Munns v. Munns, 790 P.2d 116, 118 (Utah Ct. App.
1990).
In Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) the husband, a physician, brought
substantial pre-marital property into the marriage. The wife also brought a pre-marital
automobile into the marriage. During the course of the marriage, wife was left with the sole
responsibility of managing the household affairs and accounts. In the meantime, the husband
spent over seventy (70) hours per week working in his medical practice leaving his wife without
his companionship and domestic contributions.
As to the pre-marital property, husband sold an airplane and repurchased another and
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used marital income to pay the debt on said airplane. Husband owned a condominium prior to
the marriage which the parties occupied for some seven (7) years and then sold it and used part
of the proceeds to pay for a down payment on a new home and for a promissory note payable to
both parties jointly. Additionally, husband purchased a Porsche automobile and a Blazer
automobile, using marital income as well as funds from his professional corporation. Id at
1317-18,1321.
This Court held that the credit to husband for the condominium, airplane, and automobile
were inappropriate since the property had lost its separate identity. Id at 1321. This Court
further held that the trial court has abused its discretion in the distribution of the marital property.
Id at 1322. Specifically, this Court found that the relative economic contributions of the parties
were not a factor, stating that "a spouse's property award at the time of divorce should [not] be
measured according to the amount he or she directly contributed to the financial success of the
marriage." Additionally, this Court stated that the lower court should "consider contributions of
love, encouragement and companionship, which elude monetary valuation....[especially] to
spouses who contribute homemaking skills and child care." Id
Finally, this Court stated that in considering equitable distribution the lower court should
start with the presumption that each party is entitled to fifty percent of the marital property
and it would be an abuse of discretion to disturb that presumption "based solely on the parties'
economic contributions to the marriage." Id at 1323.
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The facts in the case at bar are strikingly similar to those set forth in Dunn. Based
upon those similar facts this Court held that because of commingling and household maintenance
by the wife, separate property of both spouses lost its identity and thus should be treated as
marital property. Second, in applying the similar factual pattern, this Court held that it was an
abuse of discretion to divide the marital property unequally simply based upon the disparity of
the economic contributions of the parties.
Based upon Dunn, this Court should likewise hold that the separate property of
Defendant became marital property (as discussed in Point I above) and that it was an abuse of
discretion for the lower court to not make an equal division of the home.
POINT III
PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS
ON APPEAL
In Schaumberg v. Schaumberg, 875 P.2d 598 (Utah App. Ct. 1994) this Court held
M

[w]hen a trial court has awarded fees at trial based on such findings [such as need of receiving

spouse, ability of payor spouse to pay and the reasonableness of the fees] and when the receiving
spouse has prevailed on appeal, we will award attorney fees on appeal and remand solely for the
trial court to make the foregoing findings." Id. at 604. Schaumberg also holds that in order for a
spouse to receive attorneys fees on appeal, it is not necessary that said spouse completely prevail
based upon all of the issues he or she may present on appeal but rather must substantially prevail.
Id.
12

The record is clear that the trial court awarded Plaintiff her attorneys fees based upon the
appropriate factors and made specific findings as to the reasonableness of the fees requested
and the Defendant's ability to pay. (R. 152-154). Should the Plaintiff be successful or
substantially successful, on this appeal, the Court of Appeals should award attorneys fees and
remand to the trial court to make findings regarding Plaintiffs reasonable attorneys fees.
CONCLUSION
The contents of this brief marshall the evidence in the light most favorable to the
lower court's findings. However, it is clear that the trial court made clearly erroneous findings of
fact and abused its discretion in its division of the marital residence. The matter should be
remanded to the trial court to determine and award one-half of all of the equity in the marital
residence to Plaintiff and, second, to determine what are reasonable attorneys fees for this appeal.
DATED this / b ^ d a y of January, 1997.
THE PARK FIRM, P. C.

Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I here by certify that on the / ^ ^ d a y of January, 1997, two (2) true and correct copies
of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT were mailed, first class, postage prepaid to Mr.
Willard R. Bishop, Attorney At Law, P.O. Box 279, Cedar City, UT 84720.
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Attorney for Defendant
P. O. Box 279
Cedar City, UT 84721-0279
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF IRON COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
SANDRA CHRISTIANSEN,
Plaintiff,

SUPPLEMENTAL FINDINGS OF FACT
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

vs.
ROBERT DAVID CHRISTIANSEN,

Civil No. 954500124
Honorable J. Philip Eves

Defendant.
The above-entitled matter came on regularly before the Honorable J. Philip Eves,
District Judge, for trial on November 8 and 9, 1995. The Court noted that the proceedings
had been bifurcated, and that on or about June 19, 1995, this Court entered its "Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law" and its "Decree of Divorce" in the matter, awarding the
parties a decree of divorce, one from the other, final and effective upon entry by the Court
in the register of actions. All other issues between the parties were reserved for trial
Plaintiff Sandra Christiansen appeared personally at trial, and was represented by her
attorney of record, Mr. James M. Park.

Defendant Robert David Christiansen also

appeared personally, and was represented by his attorney of record, Mr. Willard R. Bishop.

Evidence was adduced, both testimonial and documentary in nature. Argument was had.
The Court took the matter under submission. Having reviewed the matter fully, and being
fully advised in the premises, the Court now makes and enters its:
SUPPLEMENTAL FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

As issue of their marriage, the parties are parents of three children, only one

of whom is still a minor, as follows:
A.
B.
C

Jackilyn Christiansen, a daughter, born February 25, 1973.
Kasey David Christiansen, a son, born March 8, 1975.
Tony Robert Christiansen, a son, born July 29, 1980.

No other children have been born to the parties and no other children are expected.
2.

Tony Robert Christiansen, the parties' minor son, resides and has resided with

Defendant, who has been and is the primary caregiver and physical custodian-of said child.
The parties agreed in open court that the parties should be awarded the joint care, custody,
and control of the minor child, subject to rights of reasonable visitation being vested in
Plaintiff, with Defendant being the primary caregiver and physical custodian of the minor
child.
3.

Plaintiffs reasonable rights of visitation should be construed to be those

visitation rights as to which the parties may agree, but in the event the parties cannot agree,
such rights of visitation should be decreed to be those contained in the provisions of UCA
30-3-35 (1953, as amended).
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4.

The parties agreed in open court that Plaintiff waived her right to any and all

claims for alimony, in return for Defendant waiving any and all claims for child support.
The parties agreed and the Court hereby finds, that Defendant Robert David Christiansen
is capable of supporting the parties' minor child without assistance from Plaintiff.
5.

During trial, the parties were able to agree concerning the disposition and

value of various items of personal and/or real property. To the extent that agreement was
not reached, by a preponderance of the evidence, the Court found values to be as are set
forth below, and made what the Court finds to be an appropriate distribution.
6.

It is fair, equitable, and reasonable that Plaintiff be awarded, as her sole and

separate property, free and clear of any claim of Defendant, the following:
Item #
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
(11)
(12)
(13)
(14)
(15)
(16)

Description
1985 Ford pickup
Six-Pak camper
1990 Ford Mustang
Kenmore microwave
2 television sets
Checking account at Mountain America Credit
Union
Savings account
Checking account at Utah Independent Bank
Clairnette stereo
Portable cassette player
Gas barbecues
VCRs
.22 rifle
Lynx golf clubs (Taylor-made woods)
RG28 pistol
Loveseat, chair, oak coffee and end table

Value
$ 4,238.00
2,600.00
7,000.00
75.00
200.00
150.00
563.00
40.00
50.00
50.00
10.00
150.00
150.00
500.00
125.00
700.00

(17)
(18)
(19)
(20)
(21)
(22)
(23)
(24)
(25)
(26)
(27)
(28)
(29)
(30)i
(31)l
(32;i

100.00
100.00
100.00
25.00
30.00
100.00
10.00
20.00
300.00
50.00
100.00

Bookcase
3 bedroom dressers
4 lamps
Toro Blower Vac
Answering machines
2 patio chairs
1 garden bench
1 cooler
Camping supplies in camper
Sleeping bag
2 telephones
One-half of bank stock
1 fishing pole
401K
Retirement
1 life jacket

Vi

20.00
21,680.00
15,871.00
5.00
$ 55,112.00

TOTAL:
7.

The Court finds the total value of the marital property awarded to Plaintiff,

above, to be $55,112.00
8.

It is fair, equitable, and reasonable that Defendant be awarded as his sole and

separate property, free and clear of any claim of Plaintiff, the following:
Item #
(i)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)

Value

Description
Bayliner ski boat, with tailer
3 stainless steel boat propellers
1971 Dodge Challenger
1990 Ford Ranger pickup truck
Golf cart and stall
Upright freezer
Side-by-side refrigerator
Washer/dryer
4 television sets
Checking account at Utah Independent Bank
4

$ 5,660.00
400.00
14,593.64
6,538.00
1,800.00
75.00
500.00
400.00
600.00
728.29

(11)
(12)
(13)
(14)
(17)
(18)
(19)
(20)
(21)
(22)
(23)
(24)
(25)
(26)
(27)
(28)
(29)
(30)
(31)
(32)
(33)
(34)
(35)
(36)
(37)
(38)
(39)
(40)
(41)
(42)
(43)
(44)
(45)
(46)
(47)
(48)
(49)
(50)
(51)

Savings account at First Security Bank
Savings account at Utah Independent Bank
Large stack stereo
Gas barbecue
Camcorder
Pentax camera
VCRs
.223 rifle
4 cases ammunition
Taylor-made clubs (Calloway woods)
10 golf woods
RG22 pistol
Jennings .25-automatic pistol
2 electric guitars
1 guitar amplifier
Large sectional sofa
2 recliners
Pine end tables/coffee tables
Queen size sofa sleeper
All condominium contents (besides furniture)
Chair
Oak end and coffee tables
Large sofa
Pine dinette set in condominium
1 dinette set
1 bedroom set, two dressers, and nightstand
2 queen beds, and 2 double beds
7 lamps
Toro lawn mower
Weedeater
Custom entertainment center
Yard tools, wheelbarrow, and spreader
Battery charger
Generator (belongs to partnership business)
Tools
Answering machines
Fax machine
Patio table and chairs
2 patio chairs

105.00
46.00
300.00
75.00
325.00
200.00
200.00
250.00
350.00
700.00
400.00
60.00
90.00
500.00
300.00
1,000.00
200.00
300.00
200.00
500.00
- 50.00
150.00
50.00
200.00
200.00
1,300.00
300.00
175.00
250.00
25.00
600.00
100.00
50.00
325.00
500.00
30.00
25.00
100.00
25.00
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(52)1
(53)
(54)
(55)
(56)
(57)
(58)
(59)
(60)
(61)
(62))
(63)(
(64)(
(65))
(66)1
(67))

1 garden bench
9 coolers
sleeping bags
2 truck tool boxes
1 large tool box
4 CB radios
3 telephones
One-half of the bank stock
Chainsaw
4 waterskis
4 life jackets
Boat Sonar
5 fishing poles and tackle
Fishing boat/boat motor
Motorcycle
Chevy Blazer

50.00
150.00
100.00
150.00
170.00
100.00
100.00
50.00
200.00
100.00
150.00
150.00
300.00
500.00
2,450.00

TOTAL:
9.

$46,570.00

The Court finds the total value of the marital property awarded to Defendant,

above, to be $46,570.93.
10.

At the time of trial, there was an issue as to whether or not the Chevrolet

Blazer and the shed were marital property or personal property. The Court finds as follows:
A.

The shed is the separate property of Defendant, it having been

acquired after the parties separated from funds provided by the parents of
Defendant. Plaintiff could provide no evidence as to value or character of this piece
of property, except to guess at its value. No evidence was presented that it was, in
fact, a marital asset. It should be awarded to Defendant, and has not been included
in calculating the total value of the marital assets awarded to Defendant, above.
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11.

There were disputed issues at trial with respect to (1) the home of the parties;

(2) the shop; (3) Christiansen Trucking Company; and (4) attorney fees. In deciding the
issues relating to these items, the Court was aware that one of its duties is to determine
whether an item of property is a separate property of one of the parties, or a marital asset
to be divided between the parties equitably. Generally, if an item of property is determined
to be a gift or inheritance of one party, it should be awarded to the party to whom it was
given, unless the other party has acquired an equitable interest therein by commingling, or
by maintenance, protection, or improvement thereof, or by gift.

[See Mortensen v.

Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304 (Utah, 1988) and Osguthorve v. Osguthorpe. 804 P.2d 530 (Utah,
1990)]
The Home
12.

The Court finds that the marital residence originally cost $200,000.00 to build,

but appraised for $185,000.00 at time of trial, including the value of the lot which was
apparently provided by the Defendant's parents without charge. The construction funds
were provided principally by the Defendant's parents, except for the amount of $35,000.00
which was put in by the parties from their previous home. The Court finds that the funds
and real estate provided by the Defendant's parents were intended to be a gift to him only,
in the amount of $165,000.00 as an early distribution of his future inheritance.
13.

The Court finds that Plaintiff has an equitable interest in the home of the

parties. That interest arises from two sources. First, the parties invested $35,000.00 of
8

money derive

larital asset partially

owned by t h e Plaintiff, when the current h o m e was constructed, Se »m- the c\idence
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thereafter:, t h e Plaintiff s parents invested $2,500.00 in a sprinl

J

. tor the house as

a gift to t h e Plaintiff.
- . .
home by improving it, u*air+u„ «o*^oS
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other extraordinary act. preserving the value of the home
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15.

ll

I 1 . .1

..,; w.J not establish any

1.

Plaintiff also argues that since the deed t o the house lists both herself and

Defendant as grantees, she acquired an interest i n t .
9

Jl

-

with Plaintiffs position is that the evidence is completely devoid of any donative intent
towards her. The grantees testified that they intended their contribution to the house as
a gift to their son, and that the Plaintiffs name appears on the deed in recognition of the
fact that she had an interest in the home by virtue of her share of the money coming from
the sale of the previous home of the parties. The Court finds that the grantors intended
no gift to the Plaintiff by including her name on the deed.
16.

Likewise, Defendant testified that he thought the Plaintiffs name appeared

on the deed because her money was invested in the home, not because he was giving her
part of the gift he was getting from his parents.
17.

The Court finds that Plaintiff failed to prove that she acquired any additional

equity in the marital home by way of gift.
18.

Plaintiff should be awarded one-half of the $35,000.00 from the previous

home, or $17,500.00, plus $2,500.00 for the sprinkler system, for a total award of $20,000.00
against the value of the home. The remaining equity in the home is the separate property
of the Defendant and should be awarded to him.
The Shop
19.

The Court finds that the Defendant's interest in the shop is his separate

property, and is not a marital asset. The shop was built by the Defendant's father on land
owned by the father, with the father's money. Originally, the shop belonged to the father.
However, to avoid a political embarrassment, a one-third interest was deeded to the
10
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pai tnership. Defendant's father, who keeps the scant records of the partnership, testified
that there is no equity in the partnership, l'lamlill .tl'l<'iii(t(nl lush- vv llml 111" |"",if (iinsliip
owns land, farm equipment or other assets. The Couit IIIIJS that those assets actually
belong to the Defendant's parents and not to the partnership. ti
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c of Assets attached to Trial Exhibit ? Plaintiffs financial declarat;~~
evidti.^ laiiea to she
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u

contractual rights at all, even with the landowners where it farms, since those owners are
part of the partnership. The right to farm the land may be revoked at any time. The
income produced by the partnership is totally dependent upon the labor of the Defendant
and his father. That income is a year-by-year matter and could be changed, or ended, at
any time. The opportunity to work in such an enterprise creates no equity to divide
between the parties. No credible evidence was produced as to the value or existence of any
assets other than the vehicles referred to above.
22.

The Court therefore finds the value of Defendant's interest in the partnership

to be $2,531.25, which is 25% of the value of the vehicles ($10,125.00). Plaintiff should be
awarded one-half of that amount, or $1,265.63, while Defendant should be awarded the
other one-half of that amount, or $1,265.63.
Attorney Fees
23.

Both parties seek an award of attorney fees in this case. Both proffered

evidence of the amount of attorney fees each had expended without objection and without
challenge as to the reasonableness or necessity of the fees. The Court finds that the fees
presented by both parties are reasonable in amount and necessary, given the character of
the case and the issues presented. The Court is then left to determine whether any award
of attorney fees is appropriate, and if so, to whom and in what amount.
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24.

Generally, the fees of an attorney should be paid by the litigant who hired the

attorney However, the Count ims discu'iion UIUICI iliiu11 mnvision nl 1 It "A, V M *? |'1(1S3, as
amended), to award attorney fees in a divorce case under appr-,

j

>e circumstances.

Plaintiff and Defendant seek attorney fees on the basis that ea„,. na
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attorney fees, and each ^ainia the other is
_ -t-.^ g attorney fees,
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25.

Plaintiff filed her Full Disclosure Financial Declaration (Trial Exhibit 2) in

* * h she claimed $2,580.00 per month in income from, hc< ,. *

t

expenses are $1,850.00. -She is unable
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26,
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Hid claimed to be living on borrowed money.
27,

T h e Court finds, however, that Defendant's financial statement piesenls .in
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'oughout the trial it was obvious that Defendaul

derives great financial benefits from

n far in excess of 'he negative income

he portrays. T h e evidence showed that, \v. ,;ua:..
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* i .* .

the partnership till, the Defendant has his living expenses, including utilities, phone, car
payments, insurance, house payments, taxes and other bills paid by the partnership directly.
Although the Defendant does not characterize these as compensation, the Court finds
otherwise.
28.

In addition, Defendant's father testified that the partnership owes about

$400,000.00 in loans and has annual income of $250,000.00 to $500,000.00, which clearly
shows that the partnership is profitable.
29-

Defendant also has received direct gifts from his parents which include, among

other things, an interest in a valuable shop and real property, and money invested in the
home which should be awarded to Defendant by stipulation of the parties. The Defendant's
interest in those assets exceeds $250,000.00, at a minimum.
30.

The Court finds that Defendant has the ability to pay the Plaintiffs attorney

fees, that the Plaintiff does not, and that the equities of the situation dictate that the
Defendant pay the Plaintiff's attorney fees and costs in this case.
31.

Plaintiff has incurred reasonable attorney fees in the amount of $5,500.00, and

should be awarded judgment for the same, together with judgment for her costs of court.
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes and enters its:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Plaintiff should be awarded the relief set forth above.

14

2.
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APPROVED AS TO FORM:

JAM^^^ARK
Attorney for Plaintiff

WILLARD R. BISHOP
Attorney for Defendant
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